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BAR BRIEFS
proved commercial lists and foreign lists as well as rating unapproved lists and directories and service bureaus and associations
selling listing to lawyers. This work is now in its 12th annual
edition and is published by Lawyers' Confidential Guide, First
National Bank Bldg., Chicago, Ill.
(Continued in August Issue)
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In J. L. Smith, Applt., vs. Rae Smith, Respt.
That a motion to open up or vacate a judgment is addressed to the sound,
legal discretion of the trial court.
That where a party seeks relief from a judgment upon the ground that
it was obtained by fraud, it is proper to present the matter by application or
motion in the original action.
That when an application is presented to vacate or open up a judgment
and the court by order fixes a time for hearing the application and the issues
formed by affidavits presented in resistance thereto, such an order does not
come within those designated as appealable by section 7841, Comp. Laws N. D.
1913. It neither grants a new trial nor involves the merits of the action or
any part thereof.
That Section 4405, Comp. Laws N. D. 1913, does not authorize the modification of a decree rendered in a divorce action where no change in conditions or circumstances of the parties since the original adjudication is
alleged.
Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, Hon. G. Grimson, J.
APPEAL DISMISSED. Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
In Northern Pacific Ry. Company, Pltf. and Applt., vs. State of North
Dakota, et al., Defts. and Respts.
That the Constitution of North Dakota confers upon the State Board of
Equalization exclusive power to assess the property of railroads operating in
the state. N. D. Const. Section 179.
That in determining the value of railroad properties under section 179,
of the Constitution, the State Board of Equalization exercises powers judicial
in their nature.
That in determining the value of railroad properties in this state for the
purposes of taxation, the State Board of Equalization is not limited to any
specific formula, rule or method, and is free to utilize and apply any and all
formulas, rules or methods not forbidden by the state or Federal Constitutions.
That no appeal lies from a determination made by the State Board of
Equalization under section 179, of the Constitution; any such determination
within the scope of the Board's authority is final and conclusive, unless it
was made fraudulently, or was made in such illegal, wrongful, arbitrary or
capricious manner as to constitute, in effect, a fraud in law.
That where its jurisdiction is properly invoked, a District Court has the
power to set aside a determination of the State Board of Equalization, fixing the value of properties under section 179 of the Constitution, on the ground
of fraud or excess of jurisdiction; but the court has no power to review the
honest judgment of the State Board of Equalization acting within the scope
of its) authority, and it has no power to conduct an inquiry or enjoin the
collection of taxes, where relief is sought solely on the ground that the State
Board of Equalization erred in its judgment in valuing the property assessed.
That over-valuation or error of judgment is not in itself a sufficient
ground to authorize a District Court to interfere with, or set aside, a determination of the State Board of Equalization; there must be something that
in legal effect amounts to fraud or excess of jurisdiction
That Chapter 226, Laws 1939 does not operate to enlarge the scope of
judicial review of the determinations of the State Board of Equalization, but
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it affords a remedy, in the District Court of Burleigh County in the circumstances prescribed in the Act, where the determination of the State Board of
Equalization has been actuated by fraud or has been made in such illegal,
wrongful, arbitrary or capricious manner as to constitute, in effect, a fraud
in law or an act In excess of jurisdiction.
That in assessing property under section 179 of the Constitution, the
State Board of Equalization may, consider and base its action in part upon
investigation of its members and upon their knowledge of values derived
from experience and study.
That it is presumed that the valuation of North Dakota railroad property
made by the State Board of Equalization is the honest judgment of such
Board, made conformable to law. That presumption is conclusive unless It
is shown by clear and convincing proof that in making its determination the
Board was actuated by a fraudulent purpose ,or that it acted in such illegal,
wrongful, arbitrary or capricious manner as to constitute a fraud in law, or
an act in excess of the jurisdiction of the Board.
That for reasons stated in the opinion, it is held that the plaintiff has
failed to establish a cause of action for enjoining the collection of any part
of the 1939 taxes against the North Dakota railroad properties of the plaintiff. From a judgment of the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. W. H.
Hutchinson, J. Spec. plaintiff appeals. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court
by Christianson, J.
In Elmer King and Mrs. Anna King, et al., Pltfs. and Respts.,
vs. Berta
Baker, State Auditor, et al., Defts. and Applts.
That pursuant to section 186 of the Constitution of North Dakota, (Article
53 of Amendments to the Constitution, page 497, S. L. 1939) no specific legislative appropriation is required for the payment of proper obligations incurred by the State Highway Department in the construction, reconstruction, and maintenance of public roads from funds allocated under the law
to that department for highway purposes. Appeal from the District Court
of Burleigh County, Harvey J. Miller, Judge. From a judgment awarding
a peremptory writ of mandamus, the defendants appeal. AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Nuessle, J.
In John Moses, Governor, Pltf. and Petr., vs. Herman Thorson, as Secretary of State, Deft. and Respt.
That the Constitution provides that a referendum petition must be signed
by not less than seven thousand electors of the state. A referendum petition
signed by less than seven thousand electors is In legal effect not a referendum petition at all, and does not operate to suspend the operation of a legislative measure, or authorize the secretary of state to submit the measure for
approval or rejection at an election.
That in this case it is shown that a referendum petition purporting to
have been signed by seven thousand one hundred and forty-one electors was
signed by not to exceed six thousand eight hundred sixty-two electors, and
the decision of the Secretary of State finding such petition to be sufficient
is set aside. Original proceeding to review the decision of the Secretary of
State finding a referendum petition to be sufficient. Referendum petition
held to be insufficient and decision of Secretary of State set aside. Opinion
per Curiam.
In The Farmers Union Oil Company of Epping, a corporation, Pltf. and
Respt., vs. P. W. Kilgore, Deft. and Applt.
That injunction can not be used for the purpose of dispossessing a party,
entitled to the possession of property to which he holds legal title, and giving possession of said property to another, who has no title to the same or
the right of possession.
That a suit in equity for an injunction can not be used to establish title
and ownership In property. Appeal from the District Court of Williams
County, Hon. A. J. Gronna, Judge. REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by
Burr, Ch. J.

